Amphib Assault FM 12NMS

http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/feb/04/a-threat-to-the-marine-corps-basic-mission/

GI

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During WWII it is my understanding that no expense or effort was spared to rescue downed Naval aviators, especially in the Pacific theatre of operations. It was also not unknown that in several operations the off shore shelling was not of a duration that pleased Marine commanders. One can only wonder if Naval commanders really give a rat's ass about Marine snuffies being snuffed out in a trade off where budgetary considerations cramp their style.

I am a very unsophisticated personality, inexperienced in the ways of the ruling elite, except that I know that shit rolls down hill.

I do believe we would know what the answer would be if all American mothers and fathers were aware of the budgetary considerations being weighed to Go or NoGo with the expense of developing this subject amphibious assault capability under discussion.

Will Clifford
Capt., USMC (Ret)

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Reality or Illusion? The US DoN (Marines/Navy) can "kick down" the littoral door, gain entry and maintain a doormat

into any nation bordering the sea. Once there were USMC leaders who believed they could because they had.

There was a time when this US capability was recognized in the minds of global politicians; it is perceived as a useful

tool in the negotiating kit for a Secretary of State and the President.

It may come as a surprise to senior USG officials that the DoN has abandoned that capability for the lesser mission of

performing amphibious insertions in the absence of heavy resistance: administrative landings (more or less)?

A key element for forcible entry is heavy, sustainable/persistent ship based all weather fire support as described in

past Marine Corps testimony to Congress and well documented by history during WWII invasions in both the

European/Pacific theaters, in Korea at Inchon and for "escape under pressure" at Hungnam.

Provisions for such fires is missing in programmed force planning, ergo, backing off to a "doable" objective seems prudent.

I suggest that this more modest mission objective erodes the historical image of the value of USMC. Restoration of the full

capability begins with an internal debate within the DoN over funding realistic fire support assets or discovering a "forcible"

entry concept that is less fires dependant.

Backing off may be acceptable; permitting senior officials of government to believe that the capability exists is dangerous.

Chuck Myers

--------------8TH GROUP OF RESPONSES---

7 February 2011

On 08 Feb. 1991 I slept on the deck at MCAS Ras Al Mishab, KSA - then home

of MAG-16, 3d MAW, IMEF. RAM was located about 20 miles south of the KSA - Kuwaiti border. We slept on the sand in our sleeping bags, as there was "no room at the inn." I am a big man, 6'3", 200+ #. I found myself being bounced off the sand like a featherweight. I didn't think we were experiencing an earthquake, but I couldn't figure out what was causing this. The next morning I learned that the venerable battleship, the USS Wisconsin, was servicing targets north of the Saudi - Kuwaiti border with its awesome 16" naval guns. Physics was never my forte academically, but I shuddered to imagine what it would be like to be in the impact area of such fearsome firepower after my long distance experience with the vibes. Later in Kuwait I got to see the results. I am sure glad the BB's were on our side, and I wish we still had a few in the fleet today. Semper Fi, Wally McTernan LtCol., U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)

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I think a number of the observations about the BBs were on the money, but one item that was overlooked is their survivability.
They had armor like no other ship and could take a beating and keep on swinging and we could have upgraded their big guns and
added an extensive variety of missiles. I am sure Norman will correct me, but most modern ships have minimal armor, are one hit
wonders (ok, maybe two) and then man the life boats.  There is so much electronic complexity in them, any significant hit has the potential
to disrupt all those complex systems which the Navy is struggling to maintain and operate even under peacetime conditions.
And the one 5 inch goes down and then what? The Navy continues to neglect the First Law of One relating to operations at its peril:
Never have one of anything, except one God, one CNO and one wife. That also includes single screw frigates.

If we have a war of any magnitude, those 33 amphibs and the pre-positioned fleet will be the only players in the game as there is no way
to create a "surge" of new ships in short order anything like what we did in a WWII.  If we can move 2-3 divisions it would be a big deal but
whatever the number, facilitating a prospective ship to shore assault phase from beyond visual range in some kind of a surface vehicle
becomes a preeminent requirement.  You can't do it all with helos, a few SES and 50 year Mike boats at 5-8 knots.

With all the R & D money and tests that have been gone on over the years on our favorite EFV I cannot believe something like a water
jet powered trac or perhaps even a wheeled LAV cannot be built to do 15-20 knots in the water - hopefully more- at a reasonable price.
Its job One.

PatG.

---------------9TH GROUP OF RESPONSES----------

10 February 2011

Bob,

Sorry I'm a bit tardy in replying to your e-mail, but have these points to make. In the Southwest Pacific there is little question in my mind that the Japanese usually abandoned the beach in large part to avoid BB bombardment because that was where nearly all of the BB NSFS action was. I can tell you from considerable personal experience that troops are most vulnerable when they first land and that defense at the beach area made sense if it could be risked. In the Central Pacific where the Marines were and where the 3rd/5th Fleet held sway, BBs unfortunately were generally not used for NSFS. Japanese fortifications that survived were never targeted by BBs. I always thought it tragic that the Marines landing at Tarawa, for example, suffered needlessly from a want of adequate NSFS. Had a BB been present, this would have been an entirely different fight since most Japanese positions would have been blown away. The Navy in this theater had the newest, fastest most modern BBs but used them almost exclusively to protect carriers, a task they performed with great success, but which, alas, were not usually used to support the Marines The BBs used for NSFS were the old ones with the 7th Fleet in SW Pacific. Even in Operation Olympic, scheduled for Nov.1, 1945, (where I was to be in the first assault wave) the Navy was only going to use the old BBs for NSFS and keep the new ones to protect the fleet from the thousands of kamikazes. I'm afraid that all the systems you cited for possible current NSFS taken together could not hold a candle to a BBs capability when it came to penetration and blast effect. Missiles do have their place, indeed the Navy had plans to install 96 VLS cells in each Iowa BB. But what missile in anybody's inventory could equal the effect of a 1.25 ton projectile coming in at over 2000 ft per sec.? As I said before, the Navy ought to continue once promising 8 inch programs and forget most of the smaller stuff. What the Navy should really do is scrap the incredibly costly ($6 billion a ship) DDG-1000 program of limited utility and promise and switch the funds to constructing the Capital Surface Warfare ship (CWS) described in the incomparable 2007 Joint Advanced Warfighting School NSFS study. With the great improvement in armor technology you could have an incredibly survivable ship firing long range (460 miles in nine minutes according to Pratt & Whitney) 16 inch scramjet projectiles. As well as a wide variety of missiles from dozens of VLS cells and a number of UAVs for reconnaissance and spotting. This would be a ship that could go anywhere and do almost anything. It would at last, for example, give us a ship that could risk going in harm's way and with its highly threatening appearance would provide a useful visible show of force in high threat situations, a strategically important capability we haven't since we lost the BBs. According the well documented and tightly reasoned JAWS study, a CWS would cost much less to build than a large carrier, would be far cheaper to operate and would require but a fraction of the manpower, but could accurately deliver at a variety of ranges a far greater load of ordnance that could, in a comparable time, be delivered from a carrier and do this in all weather conditions and in high threat areas which must be avoided by intrinsically vulnerable carriers. Actually I believe our carriers should largely concentrate on preserving air dominance. Unfortunately,in any case, our remaining two BBs probably could not be reactivated because the Navy contrary to congressional instructions and the law, instead of preserving the BB infrastructure, has been systematically dismantling it, notably in spare parts. (Please excuse the large font. My quirky computer is acting up again.) With my best regards, Bill

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Bill: thanks for this informative and thoughtful reply. I always tell people I would have be a Navy officer had the USS New Jersey still been in commission when I graduated in 1974. I am a very big fan of a battleship's awesome staying ability and punch. I wholeheartedly agree with you on the proven utility and visceral visual impact of BBs. I also believe their contributions to shore bombardments in WWII, Korea, and Vietnam to be significant. I would disagree, however, that the Japanese made their decision to defend away from the beach line due solely to BB/CA bombardment. The fact is that many Japanese emplacements close to the beach survived extensive naval bombardment. It was that the US proved itself capable of such rapid buildup on/over the beach that it could fight through, albeit with great casualties, any level of defense on the beach. I'd argue that their decision to shift inland on Peleliu, Iwo, and Okinawa reflected a move away from seeking a decisive victory on the beach to wearing the Americans down through a grinding attrition battle. In my view, it was the shift to the missile age that made the BBs less relevant, and precision delivery made large-caliber cannon fire a nice-to-have luxury. A landing force supported by 5-inch guided rounds in DS, 6-inch guided rounds in GS, massed 57mm suppression fire at the littoral penetration point, armed loitering UAVs and naval aircraft with 24-hour through the weather guided munitions more than makes up for the regrettable loss of the BBs. Their time has passed, unfortunately. Best, Bob Robert O. Work Under Secretary of the Navy

---------------------10TH GROUP OF RESPONSES------------ 11 February 2011 Bill: I should also append my last email. I told the CMC at my swearing in that I hoped he wouldn't object to me saying I'd probably be a former Navy officer if the USS New Jersey was in commission in 1974. I then told the CNO I was now a Marine officer because my midshipman cruise on the USS Chicago, CG-11, scarred me for life...she was the ugliest ship I had ever seen! Thank you for enlightening me on the role of BBs in the Southwest Pacific. If you have any suggested reading on their roles I would be most appreciative. The power of a 16-in naval cannon is, as you say, quite awesome. However, I agree with your assessment that the likelihood of bringing an Iowa back into commission is zero. And the cost to build a CWS would be prohibitive. I still think you may be undervaluing lethality of even small guided weapons with "near zero miss." We now routinely fire a Griffin where we used to fire a Hellfire or 500-lb LGB. And the 250-lb SDB is often used in place of 500 or 1000 lb dumb bombs. So this is the way I think of it: 2000-lb dual-mode JDAMs that can be dropped through the weather now replace the 16-in high capacity and AP rounds fired by the Iowas 1000-lb dual-mode JDAMs that can be dropped through the weather now replace the 14-in high capacity and AP rounds fired by New York, Texas, Nevada, and Pennsylvania 500-lb dual-mode JDAMs that can be dropped through the weather now replace the 8-in high capacity and AP rounds fired by heavy cruisers. All three of these weapons can be delivered over ranges beyond anything a BB or CA could ever hope to throw. AGS on DDG-1000s replace 6-in guns on light cruisers. We are once again looking at guided 5-in round for our CGs and DDGs. The LCS, with its preprogrammable ammunition and rof of 200 rpm, gives the landing force a close-in suppressive fire capability unseen since WWII/Korea. Our New amphibious vehicle will likely have a stabilized cannon of some kind capable of firing on the move in the water, adding more suppressive fires. Add in AH-1Z Vipers with Hellfire and guided 2.75 aerial rockets, KC-130Js with pallets of Griffins. Sounds pretty good to me. I love BBs. But I also like the power of precision. Best, Bob ------------------ANOTHER RESPONSE--------- Question for Sec Work: How many total platforms do you expect will be built and crewed, what will be the percent availability, and thus how many of those destroyers with their single five inch gun will be available to support the landing force. How many naval gunfire lads (we used to call them ANGLICO) will be ashore and competing with each other for the fires of those how many (how few) destroyers in direct support? What platform will have the six inch gun you mentioned as being in general support and how many of those will be available? Bottom line, given the current and (likely) future efforts to constrain procurement budgets, then O&M funds to keep those ships' crews trained up and actually deployed when *that opposed landing* requirement confronts the Nation, how many will be off shore? (Keeping in mind that tactical requirements do not necessarily allow for long wait times while we assemble a formidable task force, so ships on the other side of the world will not arrive in time to join the few ships that happen to be near *there* wherever *there* happens to be.) In other words the total number of ships procured and built will be divided between several geographic dispersals, and in each area, further subdivided between fully deployable with trained up crews and other ships that are in overhaul or other less than deployable status. Your response did not address the other ship mentioned in the email to which your response was made <snip> the Capital Surface Warfare ship (CWS) described in the incomparable 2007 Joint Advanced Warfighting School NSFS study. With the great improvement in armor technology you could have an incredibly survivable ship firing long range (460 miles in nine minutes according toPratt & Whitney) 16 inch scramjet projectiles.<end snip> Is that another good idea the Navy will chose/has chosen not to fund (again, budget constraints)? Most of us on MILINET are age limited out of the fight now but most can remember when *enough* fire support was the only reason we survived a particular action, and are not reassured by the amount of fires now suggested as *adequate.* (Air wings, available over *that fight* will be very limited by the incredible increases in cost per aircraft, so the general statement that we should be happy with air support, whether manned or droned, does not give much solace if the fight gets bigger than a limited *rescue* operation.) Higinbotham ------------------------ANOTHER RESPONSE----- Anthony, This is one of the most interesting threads you've had for a long time. There is another perspective here: That old Marine Corps tactical motto - “hey diddle diddle, strait down the middle” - has some basis in reality.   It is the need to get firmly established ashore so the supporting amphibious force which is a ripe soft target can withdraw or maneuver if necessary.   One reason the Japanese are believed to have changed their tactics and defended inland instead is they could hold out longer forcing the amphibious force to remain near at hand making it a better target. At Tarawa one Japanese submarine with one torpedo sank a supporting carrier killed more sailors than Marines were killed at the beach. That seems to have been the plan at Peliliu but Japanese navy did not venture an attack on the amphibious force.   At Saipan they did which resulted in the “Mariannas Turkey Shoot” which broke the back of Japanese naval air power.   At Leyte Gulf the Japanese almost got right in with the amphibious force but the Japanese commander, not recognizing he had such a target in his sights, lost his nerve and withdrew. At Okinawa the Japanese navy was not much of a factor but the drawn out fight ashore kept a large naval force offshore which made a great target and took heavy losses from the Kamikazes. Given appropriate modifications due to new technology, those are lessons to remember today. Control of the Pacific is going to depend on who controls the green and blue lines of islands that lie off the Asian coast. The PLAN may romp up and down the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea but if they want to play in the majors they are going to have to be able to penetrate both lines in more than one place. That will involved seizure and defense of a lot of islands. The Chinese are certain to be thinking seriously about amphibious operations and watching us very closely.   They will be very happy to see us abandon the idea of “forced entry.” PR ----------------------11TH GROUP OF RESPONSES----- February 2011 Higinbotham, PR: We are not abandoning an amphibious assault/forcible entry capability. The plans for our sea-based maneuver fleet: 11 big decks, 9 with well decks, 2 without (2 non-well deck ships support vertical assault forces, and have an auxiliary aircraft carrier role) 11 LPD-17s 11 LSDs/LSD(X)s These will carry the assault echelons of 2 brigades 3 Maritime prepo squadrons with improved seabasing capability. (Each squadron with LMSR for better selective offload; T-AKE for dry cargo/ammo stores; Mobile Landing Platform that can be seabased intermediate staging point for 6 LCACs) Each squadron supports 1 brigade. So we could easily mount a MEF-level forcible entry operation if needed. Plans also include 8 bns lift with new amphibious tractor, an amphibious infantry fighting vehicle 4 bns lift with new Marine Personnel Carrier, an amphibious APC All assault support squadrons equipped with V22. Heavy lift squadrons with CH53K, also configured for assault support Brand new recapped UH-1/AH-1 fleet All F35 JSF fixed wing force KC130J with Harvest Hawk precision engagement kits (cannon and small guided missiles) New Ship-to-shore connectors to replace LCAC In terms of NSFS, we will have 3 DDG-1000s, each with 2 6-inch advanced gun systems. Fully automatic, each gun has an equivalent rate of fire of one 6-gun 155mm battery. Demonstrated range of over 60 nm; objective range is 83 nm. These will normally be in GS of the MEF We haven't yet solved the 5-in guided round problem yet. When we do, we will have 22 Tico CGs with 2 5-in/62 mounts (44 total), and 72 DDGs with 1 5-inch mount. Depending on the number of DDGs we backfit, we could have up to 116 5-in gunmounts. We plan on 55 LCSs, each with one 57mm automatic cannon. Go online and watch the options you have with its 3P ammo. You would not want to be in the beaten zone. The CWS is not affordable, neither is it needed. We need to move on. The bottom line: The 21st century Marine Corps will remain the nation's naval expeditionary force in readiness. It will have awesome capabilities, optimized for the middle part of the combat spectrum. But make no mistake. If we need access, this Marine Corps will provide it, by force if necessary. Best, Bob Robert O. Work Under Secretary of the Navy ---------------------ANOTHER RESPONSE--------------- In reply to: "2000-lb dual-mode JDAMs that can be dropped through the weather now replace the 16-in high capacity and AP rounds fired by the Iowas. 1000-lb dual-mode JDAMs that can be dropped through the weather now replace the 14-in high capacity and AP rounds fired by New York, Texas, Nevada, and Pennsylvania. 500-lb dual-mode JDAMs that can be dropped through the weather now replace the 8-in high capacity and AP rounds fired by heavy cruisers. All three of these weapons can be delivered over ranges beyond anything a BB or CA could ever hope to throw." Any Marine could, and can, call for NSFS, only a school qualified JTAC can call and use JDAMS (actually, only JTAC's are supposed to call for air now). Time to deliver NSFS compared to obtaining air and then getting clearance to use the JDAMs- waaaaay to long. Suppressive fire - lots of steel for a long time - NSFS can do that- JDAMS unfortunately are precision weapons - they WILL kill what you strike - but again their exists a long time on developing the grid, altitude to the specifications required for JDAM. Give me air, artillery, mortars and NSFS and let the Marine on the ground use what is timely and capable of killing, suppressing the enemy and keeping our folks going. Ed Blanz ---------------------12TH GROUP OF RESPONSES-------- Anthony Milavic - - For Navy Under Secretary Work: Thank you for your very thorough outline of forced entry planned capabilities. Appreciate your taking the time to participate in MILINET, since we all know your assignment carries a very busy schedule. Headcounting: <snip> In terms of NSFS, we will have 3 DDG-1000s, each with 2 6-inch advanced gun systems. Fully automatic, each gun has an equivalent rate of fire of one 6-gun 155mm battery. Demonstrated range of over 60 nm; objective range is 83 nm. These will normally be in GS of the MEF <end snip> Three ships, two gun systems each, six gun systems. One gun system equals one battery of 155mm artillery ashore, or two battalions equivalent, total. Not trying to be a doom and gloom prophet but with world wide set of oceans, likely each of three ships in a different geographic area, so one ship available in support of *that objective* with the additional caveat that the one ship assigned to Fleet with responsibility for that region of the world will be fully trained up and deployable/deployed. Steaming/transit time (for sister ship normally assigned elsewhere in the world) will quite possibly (going on probably) preclude time enough for repositioning of sister ships to support *that objective.* Most probable scenario says one ship with its two batteries equivalent will be the available. *If* the crisis is slow developing and we can send all three ships, and all three are trained up and deployable then we get those two battalions equivalent. Otherwise, something less. Range question. Since the title of this thread centers on changing the launch point from 25 nm (over the horizon) down to only 12 nm, will the 60-83 nm range for these weapons systems be necessary? Or will their impressive range capabilities result in that firepower being hijacked by higher headquarters to strike deeper targets far inland with result that fires from those 155mm battery equivalents are NOT available on the beach? <snip> We haven't yet solved the 5-in guided round problem yet. When we do, we will have 22 Tico CGs with 2 5-in/62 mounts (44 total), and 72 DDGs with 1 5-inch mount. Depending on the number of DDGs we backfit, we could have up to 116 5-in gunmounts.<end snip> 22 ships plus 72 ships means maybe two thirds available/deployable (guessing we will not have the personnel assets to run boomer style blue and gold twin crews), and with world wide fleet activity when *that* happens, we will expect (top end) about ten Tico CG and 30-40 DDG to assemble. Will all those platforms be assigned to shore fire support or will some have been fragged out to anti-sub pickets or other legit demands on available assets to meet known or likely *other threats* to the invasion fleet? Have a limited understanding of previous amphib assault operations but seem to recall that despite the large number of large caliber gun systems/batteries on large number of fire support ships, many enemy remained to be dealt with by landing force. Increased accuracy of current/planned fire support systems will no doubt increase effectiveness of H-minus shelling/degrade enemy forces to some degree. The actual extent of that effectiveness will be very mission specific. (Some enemy forces will be more effectively bunkered-in than others.) Historically, our G2 has been less than crystal ball perfect in with respect to ID of all enemy positions for attack (by whatever means, of whatever accuracy). If we don't know about it, we can't target it. For example, we have been studying NoKos intensively for 60 years and we still have been surprised by some of their concealed facilities. They have *almost completed* numerous tunnels under the DMZ before detection. They could and did develop a fully functional enrichment facility with the extent of centrifuges we were recently shown coming as a complete surprise. Thus, I cannot be very positive we will have solid ID on existence/location of all shore defenses at all possible entry points. Reading Richard Frank's *Downfall* account of the (pre-nuke) planned invasion of Japan, we discern that even with a full National mobilization of all available resources, focused on only one operation/objective, and a four year period of war which had given all echelons of command and staff vast experience/*train up* time, we managed to quite badly underestimate Japanese forces on southern island (first phase of the invasion) and were unaware of many of their tunnel/bunker complexes. Will concede we have many better intel sensors now, but we cannot bring total focus on one single objective (we don't know where *it* is till the crisis arrives) and we certainly do not command total focus of *all* National resources. Thus we get quickly back to *how much* of the now more accurate shore fire support will then be enough. Again, thanks for your participation on this segment of MILINET. Respectfully, Lewis Higinbotham Lt Col, Infantry, US Army (Retired) ---------------------END OF DISCUSSION---- HITS: